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John V Orth*

OF TITLES AND TESTAMENTS:
REFLECTIONS OF AN AMERICAN READER
OF THE ADELAIDE LAW REVIEW
I I ntroduction

F

rom the point of view of an American lawyer, two Australian innovations in
the law of property stand out: titles by registration and the dispensing power
in the law of wills. Both originated in South Australia, and both are the subject
of articles in the Adelaide Law Review. Both spread rapidly to other Australian
states and throughout the Commonwealth. But in the United States, despite some
early success, neither achieved widespread adoption. Readers of the Adelaide Law
Review, who doubtless view titles by registration and the dispensing power as obvious
improvements on earlier property law, may be surprised by American exceptionalism. But in both cases the new entrants encountered entrenched practices which,
while seemingly less eligible, nonetheless successfully resisted displacement.

II T itle

by

R egistration 1

Title by registration originated in 1858 with the South Australian Real Property
Act.2 Forever associated with the name of Robert Torrens, who sponsored the Act
in the Parliament of South Australia,3 the system provides a rational and efficient
*

1

2

3

William Rand Kenan, Jr Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of
Law. AB 1969, Oberlin College; JD 1974, MA 1975, PhD (history) 1977, Harvard
University; Member of the Adelaide Law Review Advisory Board.
I have written previously about title by registration and inevitably repeat some of
my prior accounts and observations. See John Orth and Paul Babie, ‘The Troubled
Borderlands of Torrens Indefeasibility: Lessons from Australia and the United States’
(2017) 7(1) Property Law Review 33; John Orth, ‘Torrens Title in North Carolina —
Maybe a Hundred Years is Long Enough’ (2017) 39(2) Campbell Law Review 271.
Real Property Act 1858 (SA). For a critical review of whether the Torrens system
achieved its goals, see Robert Stein, ‘The “Principles, Aims and Hopes” of Title by
Registration’ (1983) 9(2) Adelaide Law Review 267.
I am obviously incompetent to judge the relative claims of Robert Torrens and
Ulrich Hübbe to the parentage of ‘Torrens Titles’. See, eg, Antonio Esposito, ‘Ulrich
Hübbe’s Role in the Creation of the ‘Torrens’ System of Land Registration in South
Australia’ (2003) 24(2) Adelaide Law Review 263; Horst Lücke, ‘Ulrich Hübbe or
Robert Torrens? The Germans in Early South Australia’ (2005) 26(2) Adelaide Law
Review 211; Greg Taylor, ‘The Torrens System — Definitely Not German’ (2009)
30(2) Adelaide Law Review 195; Horst K Lücke, ‘Ulrich Hübbe and the Torrens
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means of determining title, replacing the chaotic traditional practice of examining
the muniments of title at every transfer. The Torrens system was quickly replicated
throughout Australia and other British colonies, and today is ubiquitous in the
common law world.4
Eventually, the Torrens system reached the United States. A darling of American law
reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Torrens titles were first
authorised by legislation in Illinois in 1895.5 Although the system originally encountered challenges based on the American constitutional commitment to separation
of powers and due process,6 these were successfully overcome by modifications to
the Torrens legislation.7 By 1917, titles by registration had been made available in
18 more states.8 The attraction of Torrens titles was particularly strong in places
where titles under the existing system of recording were hopelessly confused, as in
Chicago, IL after the Great Fire of 1871. In addition, registration provided clarification of boundaries and protection from claims based upon adverse possession.9
So familiar was the system to the general public that the progressive novelist Sinclair
Lewis could casually refer to it in his 1922 bestseller Babbitt — George Babbitt,
a Midwestern real estate agent, attending a state meeting of realtors, reported ‘with
startled awe … that he had been appointed a member of The Committee on Torrens

4

5
6
7

8

9

System: Hübbe’s German Background, His Life in Australia and His Contribution to
the Creation of the Torrens System’ (2009) 30(2) Adelaide Law Review 213; Murray
Raff, ‘Torrens, Hübbe, Stewardship and the Globalisation of Property Law Systems’
(2009) 30(2) Adelaide Law Review 245.
On Torrens’ export to Canada and for references to studies of its spread elsewhere:
see Greg Taylor, Law of the Land: The Advent of the Torrens System in Canada
(University of Toronto Press, 2nd ed, 2005).
Land Transfer Act, § 94, 1895 Ill Laws 107, 129.
People v Chase, 46 NE 454 (Ill, 1896) (holding the statute an unconstitutional attempt
to confer judicial power on the registrar of titles).
People v Simon, 52 NE 910 (Ill, 1898) (upholding 1897 Ill Laws 141); Eliason v
Wilborn, 281 US 457 (1930) (upholding 1897 Ill Laws 141). See also Tyler v Judges of
Court of Registration, 55 NE 812 (Mass, 1900) (rejecting due process challenge to the
Massachusetts Torrens Act).
California (1897), Massachusetts (1898), Oregon (1901), Minnesota (1901), Colorado
(1903), Washington (1907), New York (1908), North Carolina (1913), Ohio (1913), Mississippi (1914), Nebraska (1915), South Carolina (1916), Virginia (1916), Georgia (1917),
North Dakota (1917), South Dakota (1917), Tennessee (1917), and Utah (1917). In 1903
the Territory of Hawaii adopted the Torrens system, which it retained after achievement of statehood in 1959. See, eg, Frederick C McCall, ‘The Torrens System — After
Thirty–Five Years’ (1932) 10(4) North Carolina Law Review 329, 329–30.
‘No title to registered land, or easement or other right therein, in derogation of the
registered owner, shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession’: Mass Gen
Laws ch 185 § 53 (1932). See Lynden Griggs, ‘Possessory Titles in a System of Title
by Registration’ (1999) 21(2) Adelaide Law Review 157: arguing that titles based upon
possession are inconsistent with a system of titles based on registration. But see Paul
Babie, ‘The Crown and Possessory Title of Torrens Land in South Australia’ (2016)
6(1) Property Law Review 46.

(2019) 40 Adelaide Law Review157

Titles.’10 But by then, American enthusiasm for the system had already begun to
fade. No more states added their names to the list of adopters.
In 1931 Professor Frederick C McCall surveyed the American experience of the
Torrens system over its first 35 years.11 Based upon information he ‘received in
1931 from practicing attorneys, judges, law professors, and registration officials
in the various states’,12 Professor McCall concluded that with few exceptions —
notably Massachusetts and Minnesota — the system was not being widely used. In
several jurisdictions, he said, ‘the law appears to have been still-born.’13 Although the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws — the ancestor of
the modern Uniform Law Commission — had adopted a Uniform Land Registration
Act in 1916,14 it came too late and was withdrawn as ‘obsolete’ in 1934.15 Not only
did the surge of American adoptions cease, but over the decades since Professor
McCall wrote his article, almost half of the original adopting states have abandoned
the system.16 By 1952 the multi-volume American Law of Property noted that ‘[t]he
subject of registration of title is of too limited application to justify an extended
review of the cases’.17 Illinois, which had been the pioneer, prohibited new registrations as of 1 January 1992.18 Even in the few states where it remains vital, the system

10

11
12
13
14
15

16

17
18

Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt (Floating Press, 1922) ch 13, 279. On Lewis’s political commitments, see Richard Lingeman, Sinclair Lewis: Rebel from Main Street (Random
House, 1st ed, 2002) 41–4, 335–45.
McCall (n 8) 329.
Ibid 330 n 26.
Ibid 343.
Uniform Land Registration Act (National Conference of Commissioners 1916),
9 ULA 217.
See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Handbook of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of
the 44th Annual Conference (1934) 253–4. The Committee found that the Uniform Act
had been adopted by only three states: Virginia, Utah, and Georgia (with modifications), and that Utah, which had adopted the Act in 1917, repealed it in 1933.
See John L McCormack, ‘Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the
Computer Age’ (1992) 18(1) William Mitchell Law Review 61, 72–3 (‘[Torrens] legi
slation has lapsed or has been repealed in nine [states]’). Six states — California,
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah — were identified as having
repealed their Torrens Acts prior to 1972: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, United States Congress, Mortgage Settlement Costs — Report of
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Veteran’s Affairs
(Report, March 1972) 22 n 40. In addition, both North and South Dakota repealed
their Acts in 1941: Act of 7 March 1941, c 250, 1941 ND Laws; SD Session Laws, c 217
(1941). In other states, such as North Carolina, the Torrens Act remains unrepealed but
is little used. See John Orth, ‘Torrens Title in North Carolina’ (2017) 39(2) Campbell
Law Review 271.
Rufford G Patton, ‘Registration of Title’ in James Casner (ed) American Law of
Property (Little, Brown and Company, 1952) § 17.37, 637 n *.
Torrens Repeal Law 765 Illinois Comp Stat ch 30 § 40 (1992).
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is not universal and is used in only limited geographical areas.19 Most American law
schools do not teach it, and most American property lawyers know nothing about it.20

III D ispensing P ower 21
In 1975 South Australia adopted the Wills Act Amendment Act (No 2) 1975 (SA)
(‘Wills Act’), which instituted many innovations in traditional wills law. Among
these innovations was the dispensing power authorising judges to ignore flaws in the
execution of a will if the instrument was found to have been executed with testamentary intent.22 The Wills Act inspired imitations in other Australian states and Canadian
provinces.23 In America, too, the innovation drew the attention of law reformers. In
1987, inspired by the South Australian example, Professor John . Langbein published
an influential article in which he advocated ignoring minor errors in will execution.24
In 1990 the Uniform Law Commission included the dispensing power — under the

19

20

21

22

23

24

In Massachusetts, Torrens is used in Boston and on Cape Cod; in Minnesota, in the
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In Hawaii, as registrations dwindled, the
legislature commissioned a study in 1987 to determine whether there remained any
reason ‘for maintaining two separate systems for holding and recording land titles,’
but in the end left the dual systems in place: see Jean Kadooka Mardfin, ‘Two Land
Recording Systems’ (Report No 7, Hawaii Legislative Reference Bureau, December
1987).
See eg, Adam Leitman Bailey, who co-authored a comprehensive review of adverse
possession laws and cases in states East of the Mississippi River: Adam L Bailey and
Matthew Eichel, ‘Analyzing Adverse Possession Laws and Cases of the States East of
the Mississippi River’ (2016) 30(1) Probate & Property 7. Bailey later described the
Torrens registration system as ‘archaic’: Adam L Bailey, Letter to Editor (May/June
2016) 30(3) Probate & Property 1, 3.
As with titles by registration, I have also previously written on the dispensing power,
and again I have to some extent repeated myself. See John Orth, ‘Wills Act Formali
ties: How Much Compliance is Enough?’ (2008) 43(1) Real Property, Trust & Estate
Law Journal 73.
See Simon N L Palk, ‘Informal Wills: From Soldiers to Citizens’ (1976) 5(4) Adelaide
Law Review 382. For subsequent developments, see Richard Bullen, ‘Changes to the
Law in South Australia Relating to Will Making’ (1994) 16(2) Adelaide Law Review
269. For an argument that the reform of succession law in South Australia left a
troublesome detail of the old law unchanged, see Simon N L Palk, ‘Hotchpot — or
Hotchpotch’ (1981) 7(4) Adelaide Law Review 506.
See John H Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act Dispensing Power
in the United States: Emulation, Resistance, Expansion’ (2017) 38(1) Adelaide Law
Review 1, nn 2–3 (‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act’).
John H Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law’ (1987) 87(1) Columbia Law Review 1.
The author had earlier advocated a relaxed application of wills act formalities: John
H Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law
Review 489.
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name ‘harmless error’25 — in the revised Uniform Probate Code,26 but to date only
six states have adopted it in full.27 Characteristic of the fate of ‘uniform laws’ in
America, several other states adopted it with non-uniform variations.28
In 1995 the American Law Institute added the harmless error rule to the Restatement (Third) of Property,29 presenting the power to dispense with harmless errors in
will execution as an intrinsic power of American courts. Casebooks widely adopted
in law schools have prominently featured the harmless error rule,30 so recent law
graduates are well-informed about it, in contrast to Torrens title. But probate courts
have been slow to exercise this power in the absence of legislative approval.31 In its
first 20 years in America, the harmless error rule has not had quite as many adoptions
as had Torrens title in the same period. Although it may well advance further in
coming years, at present even its most influential supporter admits that its spread has
stalled.32
Ever since the law has allowed owners direct succession to property upon death,
various formal requirements have been imposed. In ancient Rome, the Twelve Tables
allowed patricians to dispose of their estates, but only by public declaration in the
presence of the patrician assembly. Plebeians could use a form of sale in the presence
25

26

27

28

29
30
31

32

Harmless error, the doctrine that an unimportant mistake by a trial judge or a minor
irregularity at trial will not result in a reversal on appeal, is familiar to American
lawyers in the context of civil and criminal procedure.
‘Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in
compliance with Section 2-502 [on formal requirements for will execution], the
document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that
section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute (1) the
decedent’s will, (2) a partial or complete revocation of the will, (3) an addition to
or alteration of the will, or (4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly
revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will.’: Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-503 (1998).
Montana (1993); South Dakota (1995); Hawaii (1996); Michigan (1998); Utah (1998);
New Jersey (2004). See Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act’ (n 23) 6
n 30.
Colorado (1994); Ohio (2006); Virginia (2007); California (2008); Oregon (2016). See
Robert H Sitkoff and Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates (Wolters Kluwer
Law & Business, 10th ed, 2017) 176 n 56.
American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers (1999) § 3.3, 217.
See, eg, Sitkoff and Dukeminier (n 28) 171–97.
Ibid 171 (‘Most courts … have continued to require strict compliance’ with the Wills
Act). See also Anthony R LaRatta and Melissa B Osorio, ‘What’s in a Name?’ (2014)
28(3) Probate & Property 47. ‘The majority of states have rejected the UPC § 2-503
harmless error doctrine in favor of strict compliance.’: at 49.
Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act’ (n 23) 6. Langbein noted:
‘A quarter century after the Commission promulgated the measure, it has been
adopted in only 11 of the 50 states’.
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of witnesses, which eventually became revocable. In time, civil law came to require
an instrument be signed and sealed by seven witnesses.33 Some echo of the latter
requirement may have reached even Hobbiton, if JRR Tolkien is to be believed.
The will of Bilbo Baggins was reported to be ‘very clear and correct (according to
the legal customs of hobbits, which demand among other things seven signatures of
witnesses in red ink)’.34
In England, land was first made devisable by the Statute of Wills 1540 which
permitted a ‘last will and testament in writing,’35 but required no signature or other
formality. Over the next century, courts struggled to determine whether particular
writings expressed a decedent’s testamentary intent. Oral evidence was heavily relied
upon to establish the necessary facts. Judges upheld wills that were found to have
been reduced to writing on the instruction of testators even if never read or signed
by them, while rejecting others that commemorated oral statements of testators’
intention but were not written down by instruction (or subsequently adopted).36 The
distinction proved difficult to manage, and Sir William Blackstone probably spoke
for many in the late 18th century when he observed:
Innumerable frauds and perjuries were quickly introduced by this parliamentary
method of inheritance; for so loose was the construction made upon this act by
the courts of law, that bare notes in the hand writing of another person were
allowed to be good wills within the statute.37

In reaction, the Statute of Frauds 1677 increased the necessary formalities by
requiring that a will be signed by the testator or some other person in the testator’s
presence, and that it be subscribed by ‘three or four credible witnesses’.38 Even this
proved unsatisfactory and the Wills Act 1837 tightened the requirements.39 Wills had
to be in writing and subscribed, that is, signed ‘at the foot or end thereof,’ by the
testator or by some other person ‘in his presence and by his direction’.40 Furthermore, the testator’s signature had to be made or acknowledged in the presence of
two or more witnesses ‘present at the same time,’ who attested and subscribed the

33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

Thomas E Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills (West Academic Publishing,
2nd ed, 1953) § 2, 9.
JRR Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring (HarperCollins, 2nd ed, 2008) 51.
Statute of Wills 1540, 32 Hen 8, c 1, s 2. The power to devise was limited to two-thirds
of land held by knight-service but extended to all land held by socage tenure. When
the Statute of Tenures 1660, 12 Car 2, c 14, s 4, converted tenure by knight-service
into free and common socage, the power to devise land became general.
See, eg, Brown v Sackville (1552) 1 Dyer 72; 73 ER 152; Nash v Edmunds (1587) Cro
Eliz 100; 78 ER 358: Reporter’s notes provide information on several other cases.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first published 1765–9,
1922 ed) vol 1, 376.
Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car 2, c 3, s 5.
Wills Act 1837, 7 Wm 4 & 1 Vict, c 26.
Ibid s 9.
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will ‘in the presence of the testator’.41 The Wills Act 1837 Act influenced most wills
legislation in the United States.42
While the various wills acts brought useful clarity to testamentary formalities and
reduced the likelihood of loose construction by the courts, they inevitably created
new difficulties. Whenever formal requirements are imposed for the effectiveness of
a legal act, problems arise when a person seeking to do what is allowed fails to satisfy
those requirements, whether through ignorance or mischance. In such cases, a judge
faces the unenviable choice of defeating the testator’s intention or introducing the
confusion that the statute was intended to eliminate. In 1844, within seven years of
the adoption of the Wills Act 1837, Dr Stephen Lushington was acutely aware of the
dilemma when trying a wills case:
It may possibly be said, that the intentions of the Testator will be defeated by
this decision; and if so, we may lament it: but we sit here, not to try what the
Testator may have intended, but to ascertain, on legal principles, what testamentary instruments he has made; and we must not be induced by any considerations
of intention or hardship, to relax the provisions of a Statute (perhaps the most
important of modern times) for the disposition of property.43

This dilemma continued to trouble judges 100 years later. Disallowing a will in a
notorious case of ‘switched wills’ — where each spouse mistakenly signed the will
of the other — the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
Once a court starts to ignore or alter or rewrite or make exceptions to clear, plain
and unmistakable provisions of the Wills Act … the Wills Act will become a
meaningless, although well intentioned, scrap of paper …44

(Could the author of this opinion have been thinking of the German Chancellor’s
casual dismissal in August 1914 of the treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality as a
mere ‘scrap of paper’?)
Even in states where the courts are authorised to use the dispensing power in
appropriate cases, the judges may struggle with the same issue that confronted
Dr Lushington almost two centuries ago. Confronting a case in which the testator

41
42
43

44

Ibid.
See Atkinson (n 33) § 62, 292.
Croker v Marquess of Hertford (1844) 4 Moo PC 339; 13 ER 334, 345. On the report
of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, largely drafted by Lushington, that recommended adoption of the Wills Act (1837), see SM Waddams, Law, Politics and
the Church of England: The Career of Stephen Lushington, 1782–1873 (Cambridge
University Press, 1992) 189, 189–92. The Commission expressly recognised that
formal requirements would involve the loss of the ‘occasional benefits resulting from
the latitude which the law at present allows’: at 189.
In re Pavlinko’s Estate, 148 A 2d 528, 531 (Pa, 1959).
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made her dispositive intentions clear but died before she could review and execute
her will, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey rejected the
document:
[W]e distinguish between evidence showing decedent’s general disposition to
alter her testamentary plans and evidence establishing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that decedent intended the draft will prepared by [her attorney] to
constitute her binding and final will.45

In the end, the problem is traceable to the ambiguity lurking in the word ‘will’. Its
primary meaning, even in a legal dictionary, is ‘wish’ or ‘desire’. Only secondarily
is it ‘[t]he legal expression of an individual’s wishes about the disposition of his or
her property after death’.46 The harmless error rule (dispensing power) is an attempt
to bring the two into better alignment by allowing intention to trump form in the
execution of a will. But relaxation of the formal requirements for a testamentary
document closes the gap between intention and form only on the assumption that the
document expresses the testator’s intent. As an official comment in the Restatement
(Third) of Property makes clear:
The requirement of a writing is so fundamental to the purpose of the execution
formalities that it cannot be excused as harmless under the [harmless error rule]
of this Restatement. Only a harmless error in executing a document can be
excused under this Restatement.47

In effect, the clock has been set back 500 years to the Statute of Wills 1540, which
required a writing, but no signature or other formality. Despite clear and convincing
evidence of a testator’s intention (a will), unless there is a document executed,
however informally, with testamentary intent (a will), a decedent made no legally
effective disposition of property after death. An oral will remains invalid.

IV A merican E xceptionalism
Accepting that titles by registration and the dispensing power are improvements on
traditional methods of conveyancing by deed or will, one must inquire why they failed
to displace existing American systems. Evolutionary theory prepares us to expect the
‘survival of the fittest’: in the struggle for existence a new entrant, better adapted to
a particular environmental niche, will drive out all competitors. But Torrens titles,
despite initial success, failed to maintain a significant presence, and the dispensing
power, which may yet prevail, has so far had only limited success.

45
46
47

In re Probate of Will and Codicil of Macool, 3 A 3d 1258, 1264 (NJ App Div, 2010).
See, eg, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed, 2014) ‘will’.
American Law Institute (n 30) § 3.3 cmt (b) (emphasis added).
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A Titles by Registration
In America, titles by registration always existed in competition with traditional
methods of assuring title by recorded deeds, usually bolstered by covenants of title
and title insurance.48 But Torrens prevailed only in the special conditions where the
records were confused or nonexistent. Perhaps because the Torrens system appears
so self-evidently superior, its supporters often attribute its relative failure in America
to sinister forces: lawyers who derived a steady income from traditional conveyancing and the repeated title searches it required,49 or the title insurance industry
which profited from the uncertainties incident to the recording system.50 The specific
failure of Torrens in Illinois, the American bellwether, has been attributed to incompetent personnel in the Registry Office.51 Recently, computerisation of land records,
which has the promise to strengthen the Torrens system in Australia,52 has also
made searches of titles in traditional recording systems in America easier and more
reliable.53
Torrens’ failure need not necessarily be attributed to self-interested actors. Conveyancers might reasonably advise purchasers that traditional methods are less expensive
and more expeditious. Professor McCall, who reported on the fate of Torrens in
America after 35 years, suggested that its failure may have been due to the reasonable
reluctance of landowners to register their titles and take the risk of exposing defects:
The owner of property, the title to which is in a state of quiescence and is reasonably
well-established according to the public records, hesitates to extend a call to the
world at large and to his neighbours (the adjoining owners) in particular to come
forward and present any objections they may have to his ownership of the land.54

48
49

50

51
52
53

54

In addition, the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession provides the possibility of acquiring an original title, not one derived from prior grantors.
See, eg, Empire Mfg Co v Spruill, 86 SE 522, 522–3 (NC, 1915). Clark CJ observed
that Torrens Law ‘has not been looked on with favor by some [lawyers] who believe
that the act will deprive them of fees for the investigation and making of abstracts of
titles’.
See Barry Goldner, ‘The Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal for
Effective Implementation’ (1982) 29(3) UCLA Law Review 661. Goldner states that
title insurers engaged in ‘systematic sabotage of the American Torrens System’:
at 670.
McCormack (n 16) 72 n 39.
See Griggs (n 9) 173–4.
See McCormack (n 16) 115–28. ‘A paradigm shift in title examination has taken
place and continues to evolve and improve because of the advent of user-friendly
computer web pages and easily searchable data bases’: Patrick K Hetrick and James
B McLaughlin, Webster’s Real Estate Law in North Carolina (Michie, 6th ed, 2016)
§ 21.01, 21–3.
McCall (n 8) 345.
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In addition, as Professor McCall discovered, some Americans suspected that
Torrens was just a scheme ‘whereby rich men could seize the lands of the poor’55 —
a perception that has not yet disappeared.56
B Dispensing Power
The slow acceptance of the dispensing power (harmless error) in America has also
been attributed to lawyers’ lack of support. As explained by Professor Langbein,
[t]he professionals, who know what the relevant Wills Act requires and who
know how to ensure compliance for their clients, do not have any incentive to
encourage the legislature to enact a measure such as the dispensing power …57

In addition, concern has been expressed that providing a means to probate formally
defective testamentary documents will lead to increased litigation, although this is
disputed.58 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to acceptance of the harmless error rule in
America has been widespread distrust of the competence of the American probate
bench, a distrust incongruously shared by the rule’s foremost supporter.59 Furthermore, Americans in general are suspicious of the discretion that permits ‘judicial
activism’.

55

56

57
58
59

Ibid 342–3. See also Bruce Kersher, An Unruly Child: A History of Law in Australia
(Allen & Unwin, 1995) describing the Torrens System as ‘Australia’s legal gift to
bourgeois land holding’: at 130.
See, eg, Adams Creek Assocs v Davis, 652 SE 2d 677 (NC Ct App, 2007); Adams
Creek Assocs v Davis, 662 SE 2d 901, 901–2 (NC, 2008): an appeal was dismissed
and a discretionary review was denied; Adams Creek Assocs v Davis, 746 SE 2d 1
(NC Ct App, 2008); Adams Creek Assocs v Davis, 748 SE 2d 322, 322–3 (NC, 2013):
a discretionary review was denied; Adams Creek Assocs v Davis, 810 SE 2d 100 (NC
App, 2018): the decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and case was remanded
to the Court of Appeals. According to news accounts, the family who lost title to land
due to a Torrens registration are reported to believe that their land was stolen from
them ‘via a murky conspiracy — among developers, local lawyers and judges’: see
Jay Price, ‘For Two Carteret County Men, Waterfront Land is Worth Nearly Three
Years in Jail’ (14 December 2013) News and Observer. For other reports of dishonest
practices in title registration, see Phillip Bantz, ‘The Redheaded Stepchild of Land
Registration’ (17 February 2012) North Carolina Lawyers Weekly.
Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act’ (n 23) 7.
Ibid 7–8; Sitkoff and Dukeminier (n 28) 178 (discussing litigation incentives).
See Langbein, ‘Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act’ (n 23) 7. Professor Langbein
describes the poor quality of American probate judges. See also John H Langbein,
‘Will Contests’ (1994) 103(7) Yale Law Journal 2039. Professor Langbein wrote
‘Americans can only look with envy to the esteemed and meritocratic chancery bench
that conducts probate adjudication in English and Commonwealth jurisdictions’:
at 2044.
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V C onclusion
The fate of titles by registration and the dispensing power in America demonstrates
that the success of a legal innovation is not dependent solely upon its excellence in
the abstract but also upon its suitability in context. Torrens titles and the dispensing
power were matched against familiar and well-established practices for conveyancing by deed or will. In addition to the ordinary human resistance to change, they
encountered a characteristic American distrust of government. Successful resistance
by the prior occupants of this particular legal niche reminds us that in the struggle for
existence, the only test of fitness is survival.

